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Abstract. Device-independent quantum key distribution (DIQKD) generates a
secret key among two parties in a provably secure way without making assumptions
about the internal working of the devices used in the protocol. The main challenge
for a DIQKD physical implementation is that the data observed among the two
parties must violate a Bell inequality without fair-sampling, since otherwise the
observed correlations can be faked with classical resources and security can no
longer be guaranteed. In spite of the advances recently made to achieve higher
detecion efficiencies in Bell experiments, DIQKD remains experimentally difficult
at long distances due to the exponential increase of loss in the channel separating
the two parties. Here we describe and analyze plausible solutions to overcome the
crucial problem of channel loss in the frame of DIQKD physical implementations.
1. Introduction
Quantum information theory has fundamentally changed the way in which we
nowadays understand information processing, as many information tasks that are
impossible in classical information theory become possible when exploiting intrinsic
quantum properties with no classical counterpart. In particular, Quantum Key
Distribution (QKD) [1, 2], that is, the distribution of a secret key among two honest
parties whose security is guaranteed by the laws of quantum physics, has changed
and improved the way we understand security: QKD security is no longer based
on assumptions on the eavesdropper’s computational power, but on the fact that
her actions must obey the laws of quantum physics. QKD is arguably the most
mature quantum information technology today; in fact, QKD systems are already
commercially available these days.
A few years ago, however, several publications reported the successful hacking
of some QKD commercial products [3–5]. While at first sight this may seem in
ar
X
iv
:1
60
3.
02
92
1v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
9 M
ar 
20
16
Implementations for Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution 2
contradiction with the previous claims, this is not the case as the hackers did not
attack the principle but the implementation. The hacking attacks did not imply that
the mathematical proofs of QKD security were wrong, or that quantum physics was
not valid any longer. What the attacks did imply is that the validity of quantum
physics per se is not sufficient to guarantee QKD security. In fact, QKD security
proofs are built on several assumptions about the states and measurements used
in the protocol that are crucial, but very hard to meet in practice. The mismatch
between theoretical security proofs and practical implementations was the loophole
that created weaknesses in the protocol and was exploited by the quantum hackers.
Of course, one possible solution to fix mismatches between theory and
implementation is to improve the experimental conditions in order to guarantee that
the states and measurements required in the protocol are correctly implemented.
But it is unclear whether a complete solution to this problem would ever be possible,
due to the unavoidable presence of noise and imperfections in any experiment.
A completely different solution was proposed in [6], under the name of device-
independent quantum key distribution (DIQKD). Based on previous works on self-
testing [7] and non-signalling quantum key distribution [8], the idea was to design
QKD protocols whose performance is independent of the internal working of the
devices used in the implementation. Security should be guaranteed from the observed
statistics without any reference to the states and measurements used to obtain it.
Experimentally, however, DIQKD is hard because the correlations observed by
the two parties must violate a Bell inequality [9, 10] without post-selection on the
data, since otherwise the violation can be faked with classical resources ‡. More
precisely, and in spite of the advances recently made to achieve higher photo-detecion
efficiencies to close the detection loophole in optical Bell experiments [11, 12], DIQKD
remains experimentally difficult at long distances due to the exponential increase of
loss in the channel separating the two parties.
Among several attempts to overcome the crucial problem of channel loss in the
frame of DIQKD implementations, here we analyze two plausible solutions which
have been developed in the recent past. The first solution requires an auxiliary
measurement to locally herald the arrival of the system to the user’s location. In
this way, at each round, the measurement is only chosen provided that the auxiliary
measurement -a quantum non-demolition (QND) measurement- succeeded. The
second solution is based on the success of a distant measurement performed by some
third party -somewhere in between the two main parties- to validate each round; at
the end of the protocol, all rounds for which the third party’s measurement failed to
give the desired outcome can be safely discarded without opening any loophole.
‡ This was, in fact, the loophole exploited by the quantum hackers.
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In Sec. 2 we provide a general overview on DIQKD, while in Sec. 3 we review
experimental loopholes. In Sec. 4 and Sec. 5 we review with detail the two plausible
ideas previously mentioned to circumvent the problem of channel loss in DIQKD.
Discussion and conclusions are presented in Sec. 6 .
2. DIQKD
DIQKD is based on a relaxation of the security assumptions made in standard QKD.
In this sense, it follows the line of work of a series of cryptographic protocols designed
to be secure against more and more powerful eavesdroppers [7, 8]. The device-
independent scenario [6] is based on a minimal set of fundamental assumptions (see
for instance [13]): (i) Alice and Bob are located in two secure laboratories from
which no unwanted classical information can leak out. (ii) They have a trusted
random number generator, possibly quantum, producing a classical random output.
(iii) They have trusted classical memories and computing devices and they share
an authenticated, but otherwise public, classical channel. (iv) Quantum physics is
correct §.
From a practical standpoint, DIQKD fixes the main drawbacks of usual QKD.
Usual QKD security proofs rely on several assumptions about the quantum systems
that are very hard to meet in practice and which compromise the security of these
protocols, as recent hacking attacks have shown [3–5]. A possible, but challenging,
solution to these problems would be to characterize very precisely the quantum
devices and try to adapt the security proof to the actual implementation of the
protocol. The concept of DIQKD [6, 14–17], on the other hand, applies through its
full generality in a minimalist way to these situations as it allows one to ignore all
implementation details.
Figure 1. DIQKD standard
protocol. Alice and Bob receive
a quantum system from a source
S onto which they perform mea-
surements x and y and retrieve
outcomes a and b, respectively.
For concreteness, we recall the protocol for DIQKD assessed in Refs. [6, 14, 15].
At each round of the experiment, Alice and Bob receive some unknown quantum state
ρAB from a source S and perform on it one out of mA (mB) possible measurements
§ This last assumption can even be relaxed if one considers an eavesdropper with supra-quantum
power (e.g a non-signaling eavesdropper [8]).
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x = 0, 1, ..,mA − 1 (y = 0, 1, ...,mB − 1) and retrieve one out of oA (oB) possible
outcomes a = 0, 1, ..., oA−1 (b = 0, 1, .., oB−1). No other assumption on ρAB is made,
other than the fact that it is a quantum state. In fact, ρAB could be an operator of
any dimension, and could even be correlated with another quantum system in the
possession of a malicious eavesdropper Eve. The measurements made by Alice and
Bob on ρAB remain also uncharacterized; the only restriction set is that they shall
obey Born’s rule in order to reproduce the observed statistics, namely:
P (a, b|x, y) = Tr [ρAB Ma|x ⊗Mb|y] . (1)
where {Ma|x} and {Mb|y} are the positive operators defining Alice and Bob’s
measurements, that is, Ma|x ≥ 0 and
∑
aMa|x = 1 for all x, and similar relations
hold for Bob’s measurements.
First, Alice and Bob use an authenticated public channel to compare a sample
of their data in order to estimate the conditional probability distribution P (a, b|x, y).
If P (a, b|x, y) violates a Bell inequality [9, 10] g = {gabxy} by a sufficient amount,
i.e, if ∑
abxy
gabxyP (ab|xy) > gloc, (2)
where gloc is the local bound of the inequality, then Alice and Bob can use standard
error correction and privacy amplification to distill a secret key out of the remaining
data from measurements xraw = 0 and yraw = 0.
Security proofs in DIQKD are made from the following observation: under
reasonable assumptions, the restrictions set on the observed correlations P (a, b|x, y)
by (1) and (2) are sufficient to bound Eve’s information on the string of bits that
Alice and Bob observe. In [15], the only assumption required to prove security is
that the quantum memory of the eavesdropper is bounded, which is reasonable given
the current status of quantum technologies. It is worth mentioning that a noise-
tolerant proof of security without any additional assumption has been given in [16].
A different and more robust proof has later been derived in [17].
3. Loopholes
Since Alice and Bob are each located in a secure place and control the information
going in and out of their locations (dotted lines in Fig. 1), the value of the inputs x
and y and of the outputs a and b does not leak out unwillingly of Alice’s and Bob’s
secure place. Thus, DIQKD is not affected by locality loopholes [10]. In fact, the
locality loophole only becomes an issue if one cannot guarantee that the information
on the choice of input is not transmitted from one device to the other. But if the
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devices can leak unwanted information to break the protocol, why shouldn’t they
simply broadcast, for instance to the eavesdropper, the outputs used to construct the
secret key? In our view, making a distinction between inputs and outputs is rather
arbitrary and artificial in this context‖. Among several other loopholes affecting
Bell experiments [18], DIQKD is principally difficult experimentally because of the
detection loophole [19, 20] which sets a critical overall detection efficiency η ¶ below
which security can no longer be guaranteed.
It is worth mentioning that very recenly, three independent experiments have
managed to successfully produce a loophole-free Bell test; first with light-matter
interaction based systems [21] and subsequently with purely optical ones [11, 12].
Interestingly, these loophole-free Bell experiments directly enable another device-
independent task based on the observation of nonlocal correlations and known as
Device-Independent Random Number Generation (DIRNG) [22, 23]. DIRNG relies
on the same security assumptions than DIQKD for the two boxes used in the protocol
(see Sec. 2), but with the difference that the two boxes are held by a single party
-the one willing to generate random numbers- in the case of DIRNG. Thus, contrary
to DIQKD, experimental setups for DIRNG do not need to deal with the problem of
long distances.
Indeed, in spite of the technological advances recently made to achieve higher
detecion efficiencies in Bell experiments, DIQKD remains experimentally difficult
at long distances due to the exponential decrease of transmission efficiency in the
channel separating the two parties. In fact, in the standard protocol (see Fig. 1),
with polarization entangled pairs of photons used as information carriers and with
current optic fibre technology, the detection loophole is already opened for a distance
of the order of ≈ 4 km [24].
It is worth noting that partial solutions -namely, semi-device independent
approaches- to the problem of DIQKD have been developed in the recent years.
One first relaxation to this problem is that of Measurement-Device-Independent
Quantum Key Distribution (MDIQKD) [25], in which the two parties willing to share
a secret key prepare specific quantum states that are sent to a measurement station
in between them. The state preparation is device-dependent, as the protocol relies
on the preparation of specific quantum states for each round, but the measurement
process in the middle remains, indeed, device-independent. Very recently, MDIQKD
has been experimentally demonstrated at high rates with continuous variable systems
‖ This of course does not mean that the locality loophole is not relevant in other contexts in which
Bell inequalities are tested.
¶ Roughly speaking η is the product of the efficiencies of all the physical processes (transmission,
coupling, detection, ...) occurring between the source and the users.
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[26]. Another possibility for relaxing DIQKD consists of assuming that one of
the two parties trusts his measurement apparatus while the other party remains
untrusted. This relaxation is often known as One-Sided-DIQKD [27]. In this
situation, which is formally based on the observation Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR)
steering correlations [28, 29], the trusted party receives unnormalized quantum states
that are conditioned on the observation of an input-output pair of classical labels
by the untrusted party. Finally, one last semi-device-independent approach worth
to mention consists on assuming that the dimension of the states prepared in the
protocol is always bounded. Recently, security proofs have been derived under such
“bounded dimension” assumption for different prepare-and-measure QKD protocols
[30, 31]. These three relaxations discussed here are certainly easier to implement than
DIQKD and provide higher key rates, but the price to pay at the level of security
seems to be high, since the corresponding setups remain vulnerable to hacking attacks
on the internal working of some of the devices used, unless one has a tomographic
control of everything that happens at the trusted sites, which seems rather unrealistic,
as discussed in Sec. 1
4. Local heralding
A first solution to overcome the problem of channel loss in DIQKD was realized by
Gisin, Pironio and Sangouard [32]. The scheme is based on the heralded noiseless
qubit amplification [33], which given a state with a vacuum and single-photon
component α |0〉 + β |1〉, it amplifies with some non-zero probability the single-
photon component α |0〉 + Gβ |1〉, up to normalisation, with G > 1. The success
probability is smaller for higher values of the gain factor G. Then idea of [32] is
to use the heralded amplification as an approximation to a quantum non-demolition
(QND) measurement at Bob’s site to herald to him the arrival of his photon, without
destroying its carried information (see Fig. 2). In this way, the source can now be
placed next to Alice (to avoid loss on her side of the channel), and Bob only measures
his system whenever the amplification measurement succeeds.
Figure 2. DIQKD with lo-
cal heralding. The source is
located within Alice’s site. Bob
performs an auxiliary QND mea-
surement on his system before
choosing his setting y.
The source in Ref. [32] is assumed to produce pairs of polarization entangled
photons. To perform the noise-less amplification, at each round Bob inserts two
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single photons with orthogonal polarizations on a beam-splitter of transmittance
T ≈ 1. The reflected modes are jointly measured with his input mode via a Bell state
measurement (this defines the amplification measurement). Whenever two clicks are
observed in two of the detectors corresponding to orthogonal polarizations at the Bell
state measurement, the transmitted mode (output mode) is projected to the original
input state. Heralded qubit amplification has been observed in a proof-of-principle
experiment recently, first with polarization entangled pairs of photons in the visible
regime [34], and subsequently in the telecom regime with time-bin entangled pairs
of photons [35], although not without the presence of the detection loophole. This
represents an important achievement for the future of DIQKD. Especially, since these
setups are entirely optical, they potentially allow for high repetition rates (≈ 108 Hz
[32]).
The main drawback of this implementation, however, is that on-demand high
fidelity single photon sources are currently out of reach. Heralded and imperfect
single photon sources can always be used (e.g with spontaneous parametric down
conversion (SPDC) processes, using the signal mode as “trigger”), but in this
case the success probability of the QND measurement decays approximately to
η2d(1 − T )p2 ≈ 10−8 +. Such success probability not only strongly diminishes the
rate, but it also falls below the dark count rate of photo-detectors. Furthermore,
imperfections in the single photon sources (e.g. multiple pair emissions in SPDC)
contribute as false-positives to the Bell state measurement, which in turn decrease
the fidelity of the output mode and increase the efficiency threshold necessary to
guarantee security.
A similar proposal by Curty and Moroder managed to slightly enhance the rates
and decrease the critical efficiencies of the qubit amplifier [36]. Such proposal is based
on standard quantum relays for entanglement swapping with linear optics, but for
the previously mentionned reasons, it also represents a great challenge.
A different alternative to implement DIQKD with a QND measurement following
the architecture of Fig. 2 was proposed in [37] with light-matter interaction systems,
see also [38]. In these schemes, the entanglement between photon pairs is transferred
to solid state (spin) qubits mediated by cavity QED interactions. As this transfer
is achieved in a heralded way, the spin is only measured when the transfer succeeds.
The main advantage of such light-matter interaction schemes is that the spin state
can subsequently be measured with near unit efficiency, the drawback being the fact
that such spin read-out measurements take in general long times, which considerably
limit the attainable repetition rates. Also, inefficient frequency conversion processes
+ ηd is the trigger detectors efficiency and p is the probability to produce a singlet in the SPDC
process. For details about this success probability, we refer the reader to [32].
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might be needed in order to successfully transfer the photonic state of the incoming
system into the cavity. Note that very recently, such heralding mapping of a photonic
qubit into an atomic state within a cavity has been experimentally achieved with a
≈ 90% fidelity [39].
5. Post-selection on the outcome of a third party
A different approach for overcoming channel loss in Bell experiments was proposed by
Bell himself [40]. The key idea is to record an additional signal to indicate whether
the required state was successfully shared between Alice and Bob. This idea has
been developed in entanglement swapping protocols [41] and is to some extent the
basis for quantum repeaters technologies [42]. For concreteness, and without loss
of generality, such additional signal can be seen as the outcome c of an untrusted
measurement performed by a third party, Charlie, located somewhere between Alice
and Bob (see Fig. 3). Crucially, the outcome c has to be independent of the choices of
measurements and outcomes made by Alice and Bob. In a standard Bell experiment,
this can be guaranteed through space-like separation. In DIQKD, this independence
is guaranteed by default as Alice and Bob have full control of all the information
about a, b, x and y that exits their secure locations.
Figure 3. DIQKD with
a third party. Depending on
the outcome c, rounds can be
safely discarded at the end of the
protocol, without opening the
detection loophole.
Hence, by conditioning the validity of rounds on the outcome c, failed
distribution events (those for which Alice and Bob’s particles sent to Charlie got
lost in the channel) can be safely excluded at the end of the protocol. In other
terms, because of the independence of c from x, y, a and b, the scheme depicted in
Fig. 3 can be simply seen as a heralded preparation from Charlie to Alice and Bob,
with the remarkable advantage that no channel loss occurs between the sources S
and the main users.
This idea has been implemented in the recent years in several light-matter
interaction systems, successfully closing the detection loophole [22, 43], and even
attaining a loophole-free realisation [21]. Initially, matter-photon entanglement is
created at each site. Subsequently, photons are sent to Charlie who performs a joint
measurement that swaps the entanglement to the matter spins. Alice and Bob then
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read-out their spins with near unit efficiency. Finally, using classical communication,
only rounds for which Charlie’s measurement succeeded are kept.
As mentioned earlier, the principal inconvenient of working with matter systems
is the slow times required to perform the read-out (tipically few µs). Naturally, this
strongly limits the number of secret bits that can be certified per time unit. Thus,
an interesting alternative would be to analyze the architecture for DIQKD of Fig. 3
within all-optical implementations, which potentially allow for much higher repetition
rates. We will report on this matter elsewhere [44].
6. Discussion
We have presented and discussed two distinct architectures to overcome the difficult
problem of channel loss in the frame of DIQKD physical implementations. The main
drawback of the first method (local heralding Sec. 3) with respect to the second one
(post-selection with a third party Sec. 4) is the necessity for an ancilla to perform
the QND measurement. It is difficult to say if the future development of quantum
memories will soon be sufficient to consider seriously the use of such ancillary systems,
but for the time being, the second solution seems easier to achieve. In fact, as
we mentioned earlier, only the second solution has successfully closed the detection
loophole, and in several occasions [22, 43], recently together with the locality loophole
[21].
It is also worth noting a general trade-off occurring in both solutions, between
high detection efficiency and high repetition rate. The use of matter systems (spins)
allows for high detection efficiencies, but the repetition rate is strongly limited by the
long times required to prepare and read-out the spins. On the other hand, entirely
optical systems benefit from high repetition rates as measurements are generally fast
and no re-initialization of the system is required at each round, but the detection
process in such optical systems is difficult due to coupling losses and inefficiency
of photo-detectors. Near future development of either photo-detectors or faster
fluorescent methods for matter systems could lean the balance in favor of either
purely optical systems or matter-based ones.
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